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Although Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (HCF/FHC) and Pinker and Jackendoff (PJ/JP) 
differ in the epistemic questions they ask concerning, respectively, the nature of 
language (what language is), and the evolution of language (what language evolved for), 
it will be argued that both questions are part of the same methodological framework. 
This framework resembles the classical manner in which scientific knowledge is to be 
obtained while newer epistemological methods are suggested that can complement the 
study of the characteristics of language and evolutionary transitions that led to language. 
1. Introduction 
The current debate between, on the one hand, Steven Pinker and Ray Jackendoff 
(PJ, 2005; JP, 2005) and on the other, Noam Chomsky, Marc Hauser and 
Tecumseh Fitch (HCF, 2005, FHC, 2005), concerning (amongst other things) the 
original distinction made by HCF (2002) between the Faculty of Language in the 
Broad sense (FLB), and the Faculty of Language in the Narrow sense (FLN), is 
taken as point of departure in order to evaluate the different epistemic 
frameworks used by these authors.  
Methodologically, two different paradigms, each with its own specific 
epistemic questions, can be distinguished. Proponents of the “language is an 
adaptation”-paradigm mainly focus on the question of what language evolved 
for, the most popular answer being, that it evolved for communication (Pinker & 
Bloom, 1990; PJ, 2005; JP, 2005). Adherents of the “(aspects of) language is 
(are) an exaptation”-paradigm basically study what language is, which aspects 
are uniquely human, and which cognitive domains are unique to/for human 
language. Here, it will be argued that a large part of the discussion revolves 
around a failure to acknowledge that each paradigm entails different goals when 
the what and the what-for-question are asked. 
2. Aristotle and the nature of the scientific enterprise 
In 350 b.C., Aristotle (1970: II 3) stated that to know something is to examine 
the 4 causes (namely, the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final cause) 
that underlie that something. These causes can be extracted by asking specific 
 
questions: to know the true nature or essence of a thing, one needs to ask the 
what-question (that relates to the material and formal cause). To know how 
something came into being, one needs to ask the how-question, and to obtain the 
final goal of something, one needs to ask the what-for-question.  
Important for the purpose of this article is the following: Aristotle carefully 
demonstrated that the what-question and the what-for-question are inextricably 
related, that is, the essence of a thing, and the final goal of a thing, converge. A 
human infant, for example, has the potential to grow into an adult member of 
society, and this is also the final goal of that infant, that its “potential” will 
become “actualized”. Thus, even before the child is an adult, it has the goal of 
becoming one. Put differently, Aristotle’s world view is a teleological one, 
namely, essence precedes existence (the goal is already known before it exists). 
3. Which questions are central to functional and evolutionary 
biology? 
It is general knowledge that with Newton’s work, the teleological framework 
was replaced by a mechanistic one. With the rise of causality-thinking, only the 
how-question (that relates to Aristotle’s efficient cause), that asks about the 
mechanism, is regarded as scientific. All other questions are rejected. 
This is true for all scientific disciplines, except for biology (e.g. Gontier, 
2004: 180-195). To investigate which questions are acknowledged as scientific 
within biology, we need to make a distinction between Neodarwinian theory 
(that relates to the Modern Synthesis, founded by the population geneticists) and 
Postneodarwinian theory (the selectionist models that developed after the 
founding of the Modern Synthesis). In the latter theory, the Modern Synthesis is 
expanded to include, for example, the “gene’s eye view” (Dawkins, 1982). 
In 1961, Ernst Mayr, a Neodarwinian, still clearly distinguished between 
functional biology and evolutionary biology. Functional biologists emphasize the 
important role that the how-question plays in biology. This in turn, means that 
the whole is divided into its component parts, and then the question is asked 
concerning how these parts function individually, and how they function 
together. When this is known, the whole is known. Mayr (1961: 360): 
 “The functional biologist is vitally concerned with the operation and 
interaction of structural elements […]. His ever-repeated question is 
‘How?’ How does something operate, how does it function? […H]is 
approach is essentially the same as that of the physicist and the chemist.”  
Things get more complicated, when we turn to evolutionary biologists and 
their inquiry. Here the why-question is still posed. Mayr (1961: 360): 
 “The evolutionary biologist differs in his method […] His basic question 
is Why?’. […] It may mean ‘how come?’ but it may also mean the 
finalistic ‘what for?’. It is obvious that the evolutionist has in mind the 
historical ‘how come?’ when he asks ‘why?’”.  
 
The why-question, can be interpreted in two different ways (Gontier, 2005); 
it can be a question that is directed towards the past, or it can be directed 
towards the future. When the why-question is directed towards the future, this 
means that why becomes a synonym for the what-for-question, and thus here it 
relates to the Aristotelian final cause. Thus, when the what-for-question is raised, 
one does not merely investigate the goal/function/or utility of something, rather 
one also asks what the essence or true nature of that something is. This is the 
case, because ever since Aristotle, the what-for and the what-question are 
intertwined, and both questions together lead to a teleological approach.  
Mayr, however, stresses that within biology, there is no place for the what- 
for-question. The why-question, can also be directed towards the past, and here 
it is equated with the how-question, namely how certain characteristics -
especially adaptive characteristics- emerge historically in evolution of life. 
Hence, with Mayr, the how-question is elaborated upon to include not only the 
functioning of the component parts, but also the historical origin of certain traits. 
Postneodarwinians, on the contrary, defend a wholely different viewpoint. 
We take Richard Dawkins’ work as an example. The difference with Mayr is that 
Dawkins defends a position in which the methodology used by functional and 
evolutionary biologists is the same. Dawkins (2000: 17): 
 “… what kind of explanation for complicated things would satisfy us. 
We have just considered the question from the point of view of 
mechanism: how does it work? […] But another kind of question is how 
the complicated things came into existence in the first place. […] the 
same general principle applies as for understanding mechanism.”  
Even more so, contrary to Mayr, Dawkins re-introduces the what-for-
question, directed towards the future: 
 “The theory of natural selection provides a mechanistic, causal account 
of how living things came to look as if they had been designed for a 
purpose. So overwhelming is the appearance of purposeful design that, 
[…] we still find it difficult indeed boringly pedantic, to refrain from 
teleological language when discussing adaptation. Bird’s wings are 
obviously ‘for’ flying, […].” (Dawkins, 1982: 161, emphasis added) 
Just like Mayr, the importance of the how-question is emphasized by 
Dawkins, in order to, on the one hand, investigate the mechanical functioning of 
a certain trait, and on the other hand, to investigate the historical, evolutionary 
origin of certain characteristics. The difference between the two biologists arises 
when Dawkins stresses that questions concerning the historical and evolutionary 
origin also require a functional approach. 
To be sure, Dawkins (e.g. 2000: 6-7) repeatedly emphasizes that natural 
selection does not work in a goal-oriented or teleological manner, and thus that 
the use of the what-for-question is not justifiable. However, he does not succeed 
in over-bridging a certain ambiguity that surfaces in his writings, concerning the 
 
use of the what-for-question, an ambiguity that, as we shall discuss under 4.2., 
especially re-appears in the implementation of his theories by PJ. For now, it 
suffices to say that in Dawkins’ work, the what-for-question remains posed 
together with the how-question. 
4. How are these paradigms put to use in language (origin) studies ? 
4.1. The Chomskyan tradition and the essentialist “what is language”–
question 
Chomsky’s theory of generative grammar explains language as an innate human 
capacity, that forms an organ in the brain. The young Chomsky’s main goal was 
to criticize behaviourism, an approach that preferred to investigate the external 
behaviour an organism displays. Chomsky, on the other hand, emphasized that 
language needs to be studied as an internal component of the brain, also called I-
language.  
“The shift in locus was from the study of E-language to the study of I-
language, from the study of language regarded as an externalized object 
to the study of the system of knowledge of language attained and 
internally represented in the mind/brain. […] UG is a characterization of 
these innate, biologically determined principles, which constitute […] the 
language faculty.” Chomsky (1986: 24) 
Although language needs to be studied from within biology –as the “bio-
linguistics”-discipline dictates, this does not immediately or even necessarily 
imply that the human language faculty also needs to be studied from within 
evolutionary biology. On the contrary, in his earlier writings, Chomsky 
emphasizes that the LAD is uniquely human, and that a survey into the 
evolutionary origin of the LAD from within a comparative evolutionary 
framework would thus be meaningless. Chomsky argued that evolution had been 
saltational, leading to a qualitative difference, which excluded an explanation of 
the origin of the LAD by means of natural selection that follows a gradual pace. 
The (Aristotelian) quintessential of language, that what makes language 
what it is, is the universal grammar, and this aspect becomes the principal focus, 
the central topic of investigation, in contrast to being concerned with how this 
faculty evolved. “Hence, the logically prior task of elucidating precisely what 
evolved has taken research priority over elucidating how it evolved.” 
(Newmeyer, 2003: 60). 
In other words, within this tradition, the what-is-language-question is posed 
as the most important question. In 2002, HCF (2002: 1569-71) specified even 
more what is uniquely human and what is thus essential to the human language 
faculty, by making a distinction between the FLB and the FLN. FLB 
encompasses the sensory-motor system, the conceptual-intentional system and 
the computational mechanisms required for recursion, while the FLN only 
 
encompasses recursion. It is the FLN that is defined as uniquely human and thus 
as that what human language is. It is assumed that most (if not all) other 
elements of the FLB are shared with other animals and that, although perhaps 
necessary for language, they are not sufficient to cause human language on the 
one hand, or to define human language, on the other. Moreover, what is shared 
with other animals, is not a priori understood to have evolved in the course of 
evolution for human language (rather, an exaptationist explanation is preferred).  
Hence, here we find that, contrary to earlier works of Chomsky, a 
comparative approach is pursued, albeit in a via negativa way: 
 “[…] a basic and logically inelimenable role for comparative research on 
language evolution is this simple and essentially negative one: A trait 
present in nonhuman animals did not evolve specifically for human 
language, although it may be part of the language faculty and play an 
intimate role in language processing.” (HCF, 2002: 1572) 
Basically, within this paradigm, the comparative method seems to be useful 
only in so far that it distinguishes the unique properties of human language from 
those properties that we share with other animals, and hence to answer the “what 
is unique to human language-question”, the answer being “recursion”. Thus 
within this framework, it is assumed that it is possible to distinguish essential 
properties from accidental ones, the latter being necessary but not sufficient to 
produce human language or to explain the evolution of human language (not that 
recursion is either). This last point is rather important, and is, I think, overlooked 
in the recent criticism given by JP (2005) and PJ (2005). Namely that once we 
know what language is, what makes human language unique (i.e. recursion), we 
really do not know anything about the evolution of language, because according 
to HCF (2002) recursion did not cause the evolution of language, and language 
did not evolve for recursion, or in order to have recursion. Language just has 
recursion. Within HCF’s theory, “recursion” merely is the answer one needs to 
give when it is asked what language is, not what language evolved for.  
4.2. The Postneodarwinist tradition and the “what did language evolve 
for”–question 
In this section, we turn to the Postneodarwinians, and here, too, as we shall see, 
the how-question becomes of secondary importance, this time because of the 
emphasis that is given to the “what did language evolve for”-question. 
Although bio-linguistics, instructionist models and Neodarwinian models 
already flourished well before Pinker and Bloom’s 1990 article, it was these 
latter authors who for the first time clearly introduced a selectionist account on 
the origin of language from within a Postneodarwinian tradition. 
Their primary goal was to accomplish a synthesis between Chomsky’s 
theories on the human language faculty and selectionist accounts, by stressing 
that natural selection can lead, gradually, to the evolution of such an adaptively 
 
complex device. Inspired by Dawkins (1982, 2000), Pinker and Bloom (1990) 
state that language shows design, and that, therefore, language is a result of 
natural selection, because only language can explain such “complex design”. 
 “[…] natural selection remains the only evolutionary force capable of 
generating complex design, in which a feature of an organism (such as 
the eye or heart) has a non-random organization that enables it to 
attain an improbable goal that fosters survival and reproduction […] 
(Pinker, 2003: 24). 
Natural selection has positively selected for a module in the brain that 
carries the rules for universal grammar, and this adaptive trait is genetically 
underpinned (the FOXP2 gene being just one example), hence natural selection 
can gradually go about its business (Pinker 2003). 
Again following Dawkins, in evolutionary language research, too, the what- 
for-question is introduced. A partly physical character such as language 
(physical because it is related to brain structures or certain sets of genes, etc.) 
can only show “design” if it was selected for a certain function, and that function 
needs to be beneficial for the carrier in the struggle for existence. Thus, the 
primary question within selectionist frameworks becomes: what did language 
evolve for, to what end? Assuming that language is an adaptation, what is the 
evolutionary benefit that language gives to its carriers, so that it can be selected? 
Within selectionist approaches, numerous answers have already been given, 
the most prominent are that language evolved for communicative and/or social 
reasons, an explanation also provided by PJ (2005: 223): “… the language 
faculty evolved gradually in response to the adaptive value of more precise and 
efficient communication in a knowledge-using, socially interdependent 
lifestyle.” Language was selected for the adaptive advantages that the lexicon 
and the grammar (distinguishable in syntax, morphology and phonology) 
provide, because these elements form the design of language (Pinker, 2003). 
4.3. Adaptation or exaptation 
Dividing the FLB into its 3 different subsystems, HCF (2002: 1573) also raises 
the question of whether these different subsystems, each on its own, underwent a 
different evolution. If so, the possibility arises that each subsystem once fulfilled 
functions other than the ones it now performs in today’s human language 
apparatus. If we explore this direction further, acknowledging that the 
subsystems did fulfil other functions, then we also need to take into account that 
these functions evolved for other reasons, and also were selected for reasons 
other than language, in the course of evolution. And this in turn means that 
language (FLB and/or FLN) is neither necessarily an adaptation, nor that 
language got selected for the enhancement of communication as PJ propose. 
According to HCF (2002), especially recursion can turn out to be the result of an 
exaptation, rather than an adaptation. 
 
The difference between an adaptation and an exaptation was first introduced 
by Gould and Vrba in 1982. “A feature is an adaptation only if it was built by 
natural selection for the function it now performs.” (Gould and Vrba, 1998: 53). 
Postneodarwinians assume that an adaptation involves the selection of a 
function, more specifically the function that it currently performs. According to 
PJ, the function of language is communication and this means that language can 
only be an adaptation if it actually was selected for its communicative 
possibilities (possibilities that need to be genetically based in order for natural 
selection to be able to do its work). 
An exaptation can take on two different forms (Gould and Vrba 1998: 54-
55): on the one hand, an adaptation can lose its current function and can obtain a 
different function, and this new function in turn can become the target of positive 
selection. On the other hand, exaptation can mean a trait, that never really had a 
function or that never really was an adaptation, can gain a function and become 
the target of positive selection. According to HCF, a large part of the FLB and 
also recursion evolved in an exaptationist manner.  
5. Can we overcome traditional thinking concerning the nature and 
evolution of language? 
Basically, there are thus two classic questions asked in current language origin 
studies. Within the Chomskyan tradition, there is a primacy of the what-question, 
which is mainly posed in order to obtain a proper definition of human language, 
and this in turn is obtained by looking for the difference between animal 
communication systems and human language. Within the PJ-tradition, there is a 
primacy of the “what did language evolve for” question, one possibility being 
communication in a knowledge-using socially based community. However, in 
neither of these traditions does the question of how language actually did 
emerge, receive the prior status that is should receive. The recent HCF-PJ 
discussion shows that this is the case because both traditions assume that how 
language evolved will be derived, either from the what language is, or from the 
what language evolved for question. That is why misunderstandings between the 
two traditions occur.  
I have shown show that, beginning with Aristotle, both the what- and the 
what-for-question have been intertwined. Indeed, this is one of the major reasons 
HCF and PJ end up clashing with each other. But the most important question in 
research regarding the origin of language should be the how-question, which is 
the one we have discussed with the use of Ernst Mayr’s work. This how-
question, should be (re-)directed towards the past, not towards the future 
(because it is here that the what-for-question emerges). As such, this question 
should be integrated directly into language origin studies. 
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